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Abstract
Developing systems that are assured to be secure requires
precise and accurate descriptions of specifications, designs,
implementations, and security properties. Formal specification and verification have long been recognized as giving the highest degree of assurance. In this paper, we describe a software development process that integrates formal verification and synthesis. We demonstrate this process
by developing assured sender and receiver C++ code for
a secure electronic mail system, Privacy Enhanced Mail.
We use higher-order logic for system-requirements specification, design specifications and design verification. We
use a combination of higher-order logic and category theory and tools supporting these formalisms to refine specifications and synthesize code. Much of our work is applicable to other secure email protocols, as our development is
parameterized, component-based, and reusable.

1. Introduction
Systems with security requirements typically must operate with a high degree of confidence; we must be able
to demonstrate that these systems satisfy security requirements in addition to functional requirements. Formal methods are useful in high assurance design and implementation of secure software systems [7, 4], because they increase
the clarity of requirements, identify hidden assumptions that
the system must operate on, and certify the consistency of
requirements and the correctness of designs, among other
benefits [13]. The challenge is to combine formal analysis and code synthesis in a practical process acceptable to
software engineers.
In this paper we address the problem of building a secure
email system where the high-level security requirements are
accounted for in even the lowest level of implementation.
The particular secure email system we focus on is Privacy
 This

research was sponsored in part by Air Force Research Contracts
F30602-97-C-0310 and F30602-98-1-0063 and by the New York State
Center for Advanced Technology in Computer Applications and Software
Engineering.

Enhanced Mail (PEM) [12]. It is representative of other
email systems such as PGP [15] and NSA’s MISSI system
[3], and the methods we describe are applicable to those systems as well. We chose PEM because it has gone through
rigorous review as an Internet standard, it is publicly available, and it is similar to MISSI.
We apply formal methods to all key phases of the
software-development life cycle by integrating existing
tools: the higher-order logic theorem prover HOL [8] and
the synthesis tool S PECWARE which is based on higherorder logic and category theory [14]. We formally specify
the system requirements, specify and verify the system design, perform stepwise refinement on the design specifications, and then compose these refinements to generate code
that is correct by construction.
In this work, higher-order logic is used for specification,
verification, and synthesis. Top-level security properties
and protocols are defined in HOL. The protocols are verified to satisfy the required security properties. The protocols are instantiated by adding specific data structures
and operations; these instantiations are verified to be correct within HOL. The verified design specifications are then
translated into S PECWARE specifications. These specifications are refined to C++ code through stepwise refinements
and through the composition of these refinements.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes our formal development process. Section 3 gives
an overview of PEM and the security services that it provides. Section 4 shows an example of how a security property is defined and verified in HOL. Section 5 illustrates
how the highly assured design of the previous example is
refined into implementations. We conclude in Section 6.

2. High Assurance Development Process
Highly assured systems can be built using a formal development process. In any type of software development process,
there are at least four key stages: requirement analysis, design, implementation and verification. To produce highly

0-7695-0001-3/99 $10.00 (c) 1999 IEEE

1

Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999
Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999

assured software, we utilize formal support for each key
stage. We outline the proposed formal development process
next.

2.1. Formal development process
The ultimate goal of high-assurance system development is
producing code that satisfies desired properties. Accomplishing this goal requires two items: (1) correct system
specifications that satisfy the desired properties, and (2)
the valid refinement of specifications into code. To this
end, we employ a combination of higher-order logic and
category theory. Higher-order logic is used for verification. Category theory provides the mechanism for refining
specifications into assured code and (more generally) for
component-based design and synthesis.

Formal definition of
required functionalities,
performance, and
system properties

Design

Low-Level
Specifications

realization
Implementation

Figure 2. Synthesis phase

Stepwise refinement,
component-based
synthesis

Implementation

Formal verification
through higher order
logic theorem prover
and model checker

stepwise
refinement

of a problem into smaller pieces is done by software engineers; our process does not replace this part of the human
input. Because system specifications and refinements are
composed through basic specifications and refinements respectively, this paradigm supports component based design
and synthesis.

Formal definition of
data structures,
operations

Analysis

Design
Specifications

Correct by construction

Figure 1. Software development process
Figure 1 illustrates the development process. We add formal support using higher-order logic for requirement analysis, design, implementation, and verification. The use of
higher-order logic allows us to relate the products of each
stage rigorously.
During the synthesis phase, we use stepwise refinements
from the verified design specifications to yield lower-level
specifications. These lower-level specifications are in turn
refined until we arrive at a specification that maps directly
to code.
Figure 2 shows the steps involved in synthesis phase.
A design specification is typically composed from
smaller specifications. We refine each of the component
specifications using stepwise refinement and then compose
the individual refinements to arrive at an implementation
for the composite design specification. The decomposition

2.2. Tools
The process is instantiated into a concrete process by using
specific tools.
We use the higher-order logic theorem prover HOL [8]
for system-requirements specification, system-design specification, and design verification. Higher-order logic provides a version of predicate calculus that allows variables
to range over functions and predicates. We choose HOL
because of its expressiveness, extensive libraries, open construction, and strong typed implementation that lends itself
to being trustworthy.
We use Kestrel’s synthesis tool S PECWARE [14] for code
generation. S PECWARE is a tool that supports the design, development and automated synthesis of correct-byconstruction software. It is based on category theory, the
theory of algebraic specifications, refinements, and composition of refinements. We choose S PECWARE because of its
use of higher-order logic and categorical composition and
its code-generation capabilities.
Our formal development process does not limit our
choice to either HOL or S PECWARE. Any higher-order
logic theorem prover could be used in place of HOL. Likewise, a different synthesis tool based on category theory and algebraic specifications could be substituted for
S PECWARE.
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-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
Content-Domain: RFC822
DEK-Info: DES-CBC,BFF968AA74691AC1
Originator-Certificate:
MIIBlTCCAScCAWUwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQAwUTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxIDAeBgNV
......
Issuer-Certificate:
MIIB3DCCAUgCAQowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQAwTzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxIDAeBgNV
......
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,
UdFJR8u/TIGhfH65ieewe2lOW4tooa3vZCvVNGBZirf/7nrgzWDABz8w9NsXSexv
......
Recipient-ID-Asymmetric:
MFExCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSAwHgYDVQQKExdSU0EgRGF0YSBTZWN1cml0eSwgSW5j
......
Key-Info: RSA,
O6BS1ww9CTyHPtS3bMLD+L0hejdvX6Qv1HK2ds2sQPEaXhX8EhvVphHYTjwekdWv
......
qeWlj/YJ2Uf5ng9yznPbtD0mYloSwIuV9FRYx+gzY+8iXd/NQrXHfi6/MhPfPF3d
jIqCJAxvld2xgqQimUzoS1a4r7kQQ5c/Iua4LqKeq3ciFzEv/MbZhA==
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----

Figure 3. A sample PEM message

3. Overview of PEM
In this paper, we describe the application of our development process to the development of a Privacy Enhanced
Mail (PEM) system. This system is representative of other
secure email systems such as PGP [15] and NSA’s Multilevel Information Systems Security Initiative (MISSI) [3].
PEM adds privacy, source authentication, message integrity, and non-repudiation to plaintext email. It provides
end-to-end security, assuming the underlying communication network is insecure. It is documented in four Request for Comments (RFC) documents: RFC 1421 [12]
describes message encryption, authentication procedures,
and formats; RFC 1422 [11] describes certificate-based key
management; RFC 1423 [1] describes algorithms; and RFC
1424 [10] describes key certification.
PEM supports several common security properties [2]:
privacy, the assurance to the sender and recipient that no
one but the intended recipient can read the message; authentication, the assurance to the recipient of the sender’s
identity; integrity, the assurance to the recipient that the
message has not been altered since being transmitted by the
sender; and non-repudiation, the assurance to the recipient
that she can prove to a third party that the sender was indeed

the originator of the message (i.e., the sender cannot deny
sending the message). We have previously defined all these
properties in higher-order logic [5, 6].
Figure 3 shows an example of a PEM message; each
message is encapsulated in a plaintext email message.
There are five types of PEM messages: (1) ENCRYPTED,
(2) MIC-CLEAR, (3) MIC-ONLY, (4) CRL, and (5) CRLRETRIEVAL-REQUEST. The type of a PEM message determines the structure of the message as well as the protocol
for processing the message. The format for each of these
messages varies slightly depending on whether public- or
secret-key cryptography is being used.
Each PEM message contains a header in addition to the
text message itself. The header contains several fields that
identify the message type and provide information about
the message and the cryptographic functions applied to the
message.
Among the header fields of interest is MIC-Info, the
message integrity field. MIC-Info provides information
necessary for checking the integrity of a message. This field
has three subfields: in order, they contain (1) the (name of
the) hash algorithm used to generate the message digest; (2)
the (name of the) algorithm used to sign or encrypt the digest, depending on whether the protocol is using public-key

0-7695-0001-3/99 $10.00 (c) 1999 IEEE

3

Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999
Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999

or secret-key cryptography; and (3) the message integrity
code (MIC). The MIC functions like a secure checksum on
the message text.
For the remainder of this paper, we shall focus only on
the public-key variant of MIC-CLEAR messages, where the
message text is sent in the clear (i.e., unencrypted and unencoded) with its associated message integrity code.
The processes that senders use to create MIC-CLEAR
messages and that receivers use to check the integrity of
MIC-CLEAR messages are given by a security protocol.
Figure 4 shows the sequence of operations used to create messages to send and to check the received messages.
For example, to create a MIC-CLEAR message, the sender
combines the plaintext message with the MIC, where the
MIC is the signed message digest of the mail-message content. To check the integrity of a MIC-CLEAR message, the
recipient must determine the appropriate hash and signature
verification algorithms to use, apply them to the message
text, and verify the result against the MIC. This security
protocol is concerned only with the sequence of operations,
not with the actual structure of messages.

Receiver Process

Sender Process

signer’s private key

plaintext

hash
algorithm

message digest

signing
algorithm

MIC

MIC

plaintext

hash
algorithm

message digest

signature
verification
algorithm

True or
False

signer’s public key

Figure 4. Protocol for message-integrity checking

In the next two sections, we describe how to design and
synthesize assured code for implementing the MIC-CLEAR
message structures and protocols.

4. Specification and Verification of
Message Integrity
In previous work, we formally specified the security properties desired by PEM using HOL theories [5]. We formally
specified mail message structures and operations for PEM
ENCRYPTED and MIC-CLEAR messages. We also formally verified that PEM provides privacy, integrity, source

authentication and source non-repudiation. Because that
work provides a necessary input to the synthesis phase, we
reiterate the basis approach to specification and verification
in this section. We focus on the property of message integrity for MIC-CLEAR messages.
We use standard predicate calculus notation. The symbols ^; _;  denote and, or, and implication, respectively,
while 8 and 9 denote the universal and existential quantifiers. The notation cond ! t1 jt2 denotes the conditional if
cond then t1 else t2 , and ` t indicates that the formula t is
a theorem. Definitional extensions to HOL are denoted by
`de f .

4.1. Specification of MIC-CLEAR messages
A MIC-CLEAR message is specified simply as a tuple
hPkey; MIC-Info; Messagei comprising the sender’s public key (Pkey), additional MIC information (MIC-Info),
and the message itself. In turn, MIC-Info is a tuple
hHash-ID; Sign-ID; MICi containing a hash-algorithm id, a
signing-algorithm id, and the MIC. This simplification retains the essential information needed to retrieve a message
with security protection and is still complex enough to exemplify component-based design and synthesis concepts.
The specification also defines accessor functions that
retrieve the values of the individual fields of a MICCLEAR message, as well as selector functions that select
the hash function, the signature-generation function, and
the signature-verification function to be used. A portion
of the specification for MIC-CLEAR messages appears in
Figure 5.

4.2. Generic integrity checking
Functionally, the integrity checking of mail messages is a
procedure that takes the message digest of a received message and uses the sender’s public key to verify the received
MIC against the message digest. At this level of description,
the integrity check is independent of the message structure and thus can be specified by the following definition
in HOL:

`def 8verify hash message mic ekey.

is Intact verify hash message mic ekey =
verify (hash message) mic ekey

Intuitively, the predicate is Intact should evaluate to true
if and only if the transmitted and received messages are
deemed to be the same, according to the hash function. This
property holds under the following assumptions:




The MIC field of the transmitted message is the encrypted message digest.
The received MIC is the same as the transmitted MIC.
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Definitions:
get MIC hash `def 8x. get MIC hash x = FST (REP MIC info x)
get MIC sign `def 8x. get MIC sign x = FST (SND (REP MIC info x))
get MIC mic `def 8x. get MIC mic x = SND (SND (REP MIC info x))
MIC hash select
`def 8x.
MIC hash select x =
((get MIC hash x = RSA MD2) ! fRSA MD2 j fRSA MD5)
MIC sign select
`def 8x.
MIC sign select x =
((get MIC sign x = DES EDE)
! sDES EDE
j ((get MIC sign x = DES ECB) ! sDES ECB j sRSA))

ing generic integrity check with information contained in
the header of a particular message. We define accessor functions to retrieve particular fields of a message and selector
functions to select cryptographic functions given algorithm
IDs. For example, the integrity checking function for MICCLEAR messages is as follows:

`def

MIC CLEAR is Intact mic clear msg =
let micInfo = get MIC Info mic clear msg
and ekey = get public key mic clear msg
in
is Intact (MIC sign select micInfo)
(MIC hash select micInfo)
(get message mic clear msg)
(get MIC mic micInfo)
ekey

(*

retrieves MIC Info field from a MIC CLEAR message *)
get MIC Info
`def 8x. get MIC Info x = FST (SND x)
(* retrieves sender s public key from a MIC CLEAR message *)
get public key
`def 8x. get public key x = FST x
(* retrieves plaintext message from a MIC CLEAR mesasge *)
get message
`def 8x. get message x = SND (SND x)
0

Theorems:
get MIC hashid CASES
` 8x. (get MIC hash x = RSA MD2) _ (get MIC hash x = RSA MD5)
get MIC signid CASES
` 8x.
(get MIC sign x = DES EDE) _
(get MIC sign x = DES ECB) _
(get MIC sign x = RSA)

Figure 5. HOL specification for MIC-CLEAR messages



The signature of a specific message can be verified
through the signer’s public key ekey.

The following correctness theorem shows that the integrity check satisfies the proceeding property. Note that
the assumptions appear as antecedents in the implication,
and dkey represents the sender’s private key.
is Intact Correct =
` 8verify sign hash txmessage rxmessage
txmic rxmic ekey dkey.
(txmic = sign (hash txmessage) dkey) 
(rxmic = txmic) 
(8m1 m2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey) ekey
= (m1 = m2)) 
((hash rxmessage = hash txmessage)
= is Intact verify hash rxmessage rxmic ekey)
This theorem is easily proved using the definition of
is Intact and the antecedents of the implication.

4.3.

Integrity checking of MIC-CLEAR messages

To define message integrity checking for a particular message structure, we instantiate the parameters in the preced-

The integrity check for MIC-CLEAR message
CLEAR is Intact ) is verified to satisfy a similar correctness theorem as the generic integrity check
is Intact:
(MIC

MIC CLEAR is Intact Correct =
` 8mic clear msg txmessage txmic dkey.
let micInfo = get MIC Info mic clear msg
and ekey = get public key mic clear msg
in
let hash = MIC hash select micInfo
and verify = MIC verify select micInfo
and sign = MIC sign select micInfo
and rxmessage = get message mic clear msg
and rxmic = get MIC mic micInfo
in
(txmic = sign (hash txmessage) dkey) 
(rxmic = txmic) 
(8m1 m2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey) ekey
= (m1 = m2)) 
((hash rxmessage = hash txmessage)
= MIC CLEAR is Intact mic clear msg)
This theorem (MIC CLEAR is Intact Correct ) is identical to the general correctness theorem is Intact Correct,
except that (1) the received mail’s plaintext message content, the MIC, and the sender’s public key are retrieved from
the received MIC-CLEAR mail message (mic clear msg),
and (2) the hash function, and the signature generation and
verification functions are selected bases on the information
provided in mic clear msg.
This theorem is proved using the definition
MIC CLEAR is Intact and the theorem is Intact Correct.
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HOL Specification

S PECWARE Specification
spec MIC_INFO is
sorts Algid, Asymsignmic, Temp_MIC, MIC_info
sort-axiom Temp_MIC = (Algid, Algid, Asymsignmic)
sort-axiom MIC_info = Temp_MIC | is_MIC_info?

Type constants:
algid 0
asymsignmic 0
MIC info 0
Term constants:
is MIC info (Prefix) :algid # algid # asymsignmic
REP MIC info (Prefix)
:MIC info > algid # algid # asymsignmic
MIC Info (Prefix)
:algid # algid # asymsignmic > MIC info
get MIC hash (Prefix) :MIC info > algid

> bool

% define is_MIC_info check
op is_MIC_info? : Temp_MIC -> Boolean
definition of is_MIC_info? is
axiom (iff (is_MIC_info? x)
(and (or (equal ((project 1) x) RSA_MD2)
(equal ((project 1) x) RSA_MD5))
(or (equal ((project 2) x) DES_EDE)
(or (equal ((project 2) x) DES_ECB)
(equal ((project 2) x) RSA)))))
end-definition

Definitions:
is MIC info
` 8x.
is MIC info x =
((FST x = RSA MD2) _ (FST x = RSA MD5)) ^
((FST (SND x) = DES EDE) _
(FST (SND x) = DES ECB) _
(FST (SND x) = RSA))
MIC info TY DEF
` 9rep. TYPE DEFINITION is MIC info rep
MIC info ISO DEF
` (8a. MIC Info (REP MIC info a) = a) ^
(8r. is MIC info r = REP MIC info (MIC Info r) = r)
get MIC hash

` 8x. get MIC algid x = FST (REP MIC info x)

% define get_MIC_hash
op get_MIC_hash : MIC_info -> algid
definition of get_MIC_hash is
axiom (equal (get_MIC_hash x)
((project 1) ((relax is_MIC_info?) x)))
end-definition
...
end-spec

Figure 6. Comparison of HOL and S PECWARE specifications for MIC-Info

5. Synthesis of PEM MIC-CLEAR
Messages
Having verified that the specifications for (the design of) the
data structures and operations satisfy the required integrity
property, we turn to the synthesis phase of system development. The previous analysis is legitimate for the final system only if the synthesized code can be related formally to
the specifications. To this end, we specify the PEM system
in S PECWARE and then refine it to code. The HOL specification serves as a road map for the S PECWARE specification, as the two specifications are very similar. Figure 6 illustrates the syntactic similarity of the HOL and S PECWARE
specifications for the MIC-Info structure.

5.1. Theoretical basis of SPECWARE
The implementation phase relies on S PECWARE’s support
for both the composition of specifications and the refinement of specifications into C++ code. These composition and refinement processes are based on categorical constructions involving categories of algebraic specifications.

Roughly speaking, a specification comprises a signature
(i.e., a collection of sorts (or types) and a collection of operators over those sorts) and a collection of axioms over those
sorts [9]. A specification morphism between two specifications is a mapping between their signatures that preserves
theorems. Intuitively, a specification morphism from A to
B indicates how A can be extended to B (equivalently, how
every model of B can be viewed as a model of A).
Whenever a specification A can be extended to two different specifications B and C, there is a canonical composite
specification that exhibits all the properties of both B and C.
This specification can be obtained as a quotient of the disjoint union of the two specifications, where individual sorts
and operators of B and C are unified exactly when they are
the extensions of the same sort or operator in A. This construction is based on categorical pushouts (or, more generally, finite colimits).
Pushouts and other finite colimits form the basis for instantiation of parameterized specifications. For example,
we can compose a specification HASH for hash functions
with a specification SIGN for signature-generation functions to yield a specification for generating MICs on the
messages, as shown in Figure 7. In this diagram, dotted
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lines represent element mappings, while solid lines represent specification morphisms. Thus the single sort E in
ONE SORT is mapped to both md in HASH and plaintext in
SIGN. As a result, md and plaintext are identified as the single sort md1 in the resulting specification SIGN HASH, as
evidenced by the types of the operators hMD2 and sRSA.

color-as-bool-pair
bool-pair
traffic light
sort: color
operators:
green
red
yellow

sort: med-color
operators:
med-green
med-red
med-yellow

sort: bool x bool
operators:
(T, T)
(T, F)
(F, T)
(F, F)

SIGN
ONE_SORT
sort:
E

sorts:
plaintext
signature
private_key

Figure 8. Interpretation color-to-bool-pair: implementation of color with a boolean pair

operator:
sRSA:private_key -> plaintext -> signature

HASH
sorts:
message
md
operator:
hMD2: message -> md

SIGN_HASH
sorts: message, md, signature, private_key
operators:
hMD2: message -> md
sRSA: private_key -> md -> signature

Figure 7. Composition of specifications for hash and for
digital signature
Refinement of specifications—the mechanism by which
code is synthesized— also occurs via colimits, in a category
of specifications and interpretations. An interpretation from
A to B can be viewed as a specification morphism from A
to a definitional extension of B, which is a specification that
expands B’s collection of sorts, operators, and axioms without altering its collection of models.
These interpretations serve as refinements. For example, suppose we have a source specification for traffic light
that has one sort color, and three operators (or constants)
green, red and yellow. We can implement traffic light using a pair of booleans through a mediating specification
color-as-bool-pair. In color-as-bool-pair we introduce a new sort med-color whose elements are defined in
terms of a subset of (the constructed) sort bool  bool. We
then map the sort color to med-color and the operators of
sort color to operators of sort med-color. The interpretation
color-to-bool-pair is illustrated in Figure 8; in this diagram,
dotted lines represent element mappings, and solid line represents isomorphic mapping for introducing new type.
Refinements can themselves be composed, in what are
termed sequential compositions and parallel compositions.
Sequential composition can be viewed as transitivity of refinements: a refinement from A to B can be composed with
1 The selection of the (overloaded) name md for the unified sort is a
design decision.

a refinement of B to C to yield a refinement from A to C.
Parallel composition is based on colimits of interpretations.
In particular, the refinement of a system obtained by composing several components can be obtained by a parallel
composition of the individual components’ refinements. As
a result, a library of relatively small specifications can be
used to generate code for a large system: the small specifications can be composed to create a large specification
whose refinement into code is obtained by the composition
of the refinements of the small specifications.

5.2. Specification for PEM MIC-CLEAR
messages
During the specification process, we build specifications via
the composition of basic specifications.
We create a specification SECURE MAIL to specify a mail
system with integrity protection (see Figure 9). This spec-

spec SECURE_MAIL is
sorts Message, Md, Hash, MIC, Pkey, Verify
sort-axiom Hash = Message -> Md
sort-axiom Verify = (Pkey, Md, MIC)
-> boolean
op is_Intact : (Verify, Hash, Message,
MIC, Pkey) -> boolean
definition of is_Intact is
axiom (equal (is_Intact v h msg mic ekey)
(v ekey (h msg) mic))
end-definition
end-spec

Figure 9. S PECWARE specification SECURE MAIL
ification does not impose any particular message structure
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CRYPTO_SELECTION
SECURE_MAIL
THREE_SORTS
sorts:
E
F
G

sorts:
Pkey
Md
Hash = Message -> Md
Message
MIC
Verify = (Pkey, MD, MIC) -> boolean

SEVEN_SORTS
sorts:
E
F
G
...

operator:
is_Intact

*

MIC_CLEAR
sorts:
Pkey
Temp_MIC = (Algid, Algid, Asymsignmic)
Message
MIC_clear = (Pkey, MIC-Info, Message)
Asymsignmic
Algid
MIC-Info = Temp_MIC | is_MIC_info?
operators:
is_MIC_info?
get__MIC_hash
get_MIC_verify
get_MIC_mic
... (other accessor functions)

*

MIC_CLEAR_w_SECURITY

sorts:
Pkey
Md
Hash = Message -> Md
Message
MIC
Verify = (Pkey, MD, MIC) -> boolean
Algid
operators:
hash_select: Algid -> Hash
verify_select: Algid -> Verify
hRSA_MD2: Hash
hRSA_MD5: Hash
vRSA: Verify:
vDES_EDE: Verify
vDES_ECB: Verify

PEM_MIC_CLEAR

NOTE:
*: unification of each sort in CRYPTO_SELECTION with the sort of
the same name in MIC_CLEAR_w_SECURITY
Solid line with arrow: specification morphism
Dashed line with arrow: sort mapping between specifications

Figure 10. Specification for PEM MIC-CLEAR messages



MIC CLEAR defines a PEM MIC-CLEAR message



CRYPTO SELECTION defines types for hash functions,

morphisms and illustrate how the sorts of MIC CLEAR and
SECURE MAIL are unified.
The ultimate result of composing these specifications is
a specification PEM MIC CLEAR for a PEM MIC-CLEAR
mail system with an integrity check. Replacing the specification MIC CLEAR in this composition with a specification for a PEM ENCRYPTED message would yield a
specification for a PEM ENCRYPTED system with an
integrity check. Likewise, replacing MIC CLEAR with a
specification for a MISSI message structure and replacing
CRYPTO SELECTION with a MISSI specification for cryptographic algorithms would yield a specification for a MISSI
implementation with an integrity check.

signature-verification functions, and algorithm IDs,
and also defines selector functions that map algorithm
IDs to cryptographic functions.

5.3.

on the mail; the integrity check is Intact is independent of
message structures and protocols. We can reuse this specification for different mail systems with different message
structures.
We build a specification for PEM MIC-CLEAR messages by composing SECURE MAIL with following specifications:

structure, together with accessor functions that retrieve
the fields from mail messages.

The composition is shown in Figure 10. In this figure, the
boxes represent individual specifications, while the solid arrows represent specification morphisms. The dotted arrows
from THREE SORTS to MIC CLEAR and to SECURE MAIL indicate the individual sort mappings of two specification

Refinement of specifications

To refine the composite specification PEM MIC CLEAR, we
refine its components and then compose the resulting refinements. When the refinements become sufficiently low
level, S PECWARE supports the translation of the lowestlevel specifications into C++ code through the use of built-
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SEVEN_
SORTS

MIC_CLEAR_
w_SECURITY

CRYPTO_
SELECTION

s_CRYPTO_
SEL1

SLANGBASE

...

...
C++

SLANGBASE

References

CRYPTO_
FUN

C++

...
C++

s_PEM_MC

parallel composition

C++

...

s_MCS

Figure 11.

parallel composition

SEVEN_
SORTS

CRYPTO_
SELECTION

MCS

SEVEN_SORT_
via_SUBSORT

PEM_MIC_CLEAR

specification for each component of PEM. The use of abstract data type helps partition the system into modules,
which should increase system maintainability. We have
benefited from the emphasis on modularity and composition: we were able to rebuild the system easily when components were changed.
The formal specification and verification, together with
the use of component-based design, helped us identify a secure core protocol that is common to many secure email
systems. Once the details of the mail-message structures
of different mail systems have been abstracted away, the
underlying core protocol appears the same. We are in the
process of formally specifying and implementing this core
protocol. We will (re)use the core protocol to specify and
synthesize both PEM and PGP formally and to relate these
two secure email systems.

c_PEM_MIC_CLEAR

Refinement of composite specification

PEM MIC CLEAR

in theories. Figure 11 sketches the refinement process; the
refinements (i.e., interpretations) appear as the vertical double arrows.
A portion of the resulting code appears in Figure 12.

6. Conclusions
The purpose of this work was to demonstrate an integrated
verification and synthesis process on an engineering application. Higher-order logic bridges the two systems used for
verification and for synthesis; it is a useful intermediate language for relating formal tools.
The automatically generated code was not as concise as
custom designed code. Nevertheless, it was assured code
that worked.
In constructing this system, we developed an algebraic
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}
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return
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(verify_select (get_mc_verify ( product(_x_1, _x_2, _x_3) )),
hash_select (get_mc_hash ( product(_x_1, _x_2, _x_3) )),
get_mc_message ( product (_x_1, _x_2, _x_3) ),
get_mc_mic ( product (_x_1, _x_2, _x_3) ),
get_mc_pkey ( product (_x_1, _x_2, _x_3) ));
}
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